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MANAGING NEW-STYLE CURRENCY CRISES: 
THE SWAN DIAGRAM APPROACH REVISITED 
 
 
  Abstract 
 
The new-style currency crises that have inflicted a number of 
developing  and  emerging  economies  of  late  are  characterized  by 
sudden  stops  in  capital  inflows  and  adverse  balance  sheet  effects. 
Given  the  potential  high  costs  of  these  crises,  there  remains  an 
ongoing debate on how they might best be managed when they do 
arise. This paper argues that the age-old Swan diagram, appropriately 
modified, is able to provide useful insights into how a country might 
manage  a  new-style  crisis  via  a  combination  of  adjustment  (which 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The intensity and suddenness of recent currency crises has inspired a “third 
generation” crisis literature that focuses on: (a) sharp increases in the domestic value 
of foreign currency debt (so-called “balance sheet effects”) which adversely affect a 
country’s  solvency  position  and  (b)  “sudden  stops”  in  capital  inflows  (including 
outright  reversals)  which  negatively  influence  a  country’s  liquidity  position.
1  As 
Dornbusch (2001) notes:                
 
A new-style crisis involves doubt about credit worthiness of the balance 
sheet  of  a  significant  part  of  the  economy..  and  the  exchange 
rate…(W)hen  there  is  a  question  about  one,  the  implied  capital  flight 
makes it immediately a question about both… (The) central part of the 
new-style crisis is the focus on balance sheets and capital flight…(T)hey 
involve  a  far  more  dramatic  impact  on  economic  activity  than  mere 
current account disturbances…both in terms of magnitude of the financial 
shock  as  well  as  disorganization  effects  stemming  from  illiquidity  or 
bankruptcy. 
 
Using a sample of 49 middle and larger income countries over the period 
1992-99, Stone and Weeks (2001) find that the curtailment of private capital flows 
and adverse balance sheet effects are among the most important factors determining 
the  intensity of  currency crises (defined as loss  of real GDP relative  to  pre-crisis 
trend, conditional on the occurrence of a crisis). Using a sample of 24 developing and 
emerging economies over the period 1975-97, Hutchison and Noy (2002) find that 
while currency crises are associated with declines in investments and overall output 
in the short run, the real sector contractions are particularly marked in cases where 
currency crises occur simultaneously with current account reversals (Table 1). These 
current account reversals could either be because of a cessation of private capital 
flows per se (liquidity crunch) or adverse balance sheet effects (solvency crunch).
2 
                                                
1 For a discussion of the economic consequences of sudden stops in capital inflows, see 
Calvo and Reinhart (2000).  
 
2 While Hutchison and Noy (2002) opine that the coincidence of current account reversals and 
currency crises are due only to a curtailment in capital flows (“sudden stops”), these current 
account  reversals  may  occur  if  there  are  significant  domestic  insolvencies,  leading  to  a 
curtailment of imports, for instance.  
    3 
Distinguishing between the probability or warning signs of a crisis, on the one 
hand, and the intensity or depth of a crisis, on the other, is consistent with Calvo and 
Mendoza (1996) and Rajan (2001) who suggest that new-style crises in developing 
and emerging economies ought to be seen as involving two stages: (a) an initial 
currency crisis/speculative attack which can either be self-fulfilling or fundamentals 
based and (b) the post-crisis output dynamics. While the first two generation of crisis 
models are well-equipped to handle the first issue (i.e. why does a crisis occur in the 
first instance?), the third generation crisis models are more pertinent to examining 
the second issue (i.e. what happens after the actual speculative attack?).
3    
Given the potential high costs of these new-style or “capital account” crises, 
there remains an ongoing debate on how they might best be managed when they do 
arise. While  some  popular  International  Economics  textbooks  continue  to  include 
brief discussions of the age-old Swan diagram, they have not used it to discuss new-
style crises and appropriate crisis management policies.
4 Another obvious limitation 
of  the  Swan  diagram  --  as  it  is  conventionally  presented  --  is  the  lack  of  good 
microfoundations. This in turn  may  partly  explain  why  its popularity  has dwindled 
substantially over the last few decades.  
The  objective  of this paper is  to  contribute to  resuscitating the  use of the 
Swan diagram in the classroom and in policy discussions on crisis management. The 
next section briefly reviews the traditional framework of internal and external balance. 
Section 3 revisits the external balance (EB) schedule and shows how it might be 
reinterpreted  as  the financial  side  of  the  economy.  Section  4  revisits  the  internal 
                                                
3 Also see Mulder, Perrelli and Rocha (2002). For recent literature reviews on the first and 
second generation crises models, see Flood and Marion (1999), Jeanne (2000) and Rajan 
(2001) in the context of the Thai crisis of 1997-98. Caves, Frankel and Jones (2003, Chapter 
24) describe third generation models as being moral hazard driven at the national level a la 
Dooley (2000). However, the Dooley “insurance” model is more appropriately seen as being 
part of the first generation family pioneered by Krugman (1979). 
 
4 For instance, there is an interesting but rather general and wide-ranging discussion of crises 
in developing and emerging economies in Chapter 24 of Caves, Frankel and Jones (2003). 
However, the authors make little attempt to relate the discussion to the analytics of the Swan 
diagram introduced in Chapter 18 of their book. Also see Salvatore (2003, Chapter 18).   4 
balance (IB) schedule and offers a simple model of the real side of the economy to 
explain  why  real  devaluations  might  be  contractionary  rather  than  expansionary. 
Focus is on the open economy balance sheet approach -- i.e. corporate leverage in 
unhedged foreign currency terms -- which is taking on increasing significance in the 
IMF’s policy analysis and prescriptions (for instance, see Allen et al., 2002 and IMF, 
2003a).
5 The penultimate section discusses the desirable policy mix in response to 
stylized shocks and different scenarios. The final section concludes the paper with a 
brief discussion of how a country might reduce its vulnerability to adverse balance 
sheet effects.  
 
2.   Internal Balance (IB) versus External Balance (EB): Conventional Theory 
 
The typical Swan diagram plots real exchange rates against real income or 
absorption. Policies to affect real absorption can either be fiscal or monetary. For 
instance,  Krugman  (1998)  focuses  on  fiscal  policy  as  the  sole  absorption  or 
expenditure-reducing tool. The Swan diagram is also sometimes discussed in the 
context of monetary policy vis-à-vis fiscal policy, with the implicit assumption of a 
fixed exchange rate (e.g. Salvatore, Chapter 18, pp.640-2). The approach used in 
this paper -- inspired by Frankel (2001) -- considers a “modified” Swan Diagram with 
real  interest  rates  ) ( t i on  the  vertical  axis  and  real  exchange  rates  ) ( t e   on  the 
horizontal axis. We ignore fiscal policy altogether. Why?  
The issue of appropriate fiscal policy stance during a crisis broadly involves 
conflicting  pressures  and  tradeoffs.  On  the  one  hand,  given  the  implicit  or  quasi 
deficits  of  the  government  (because  of  their  blanket  guarantees  on  banks, 
sterilization costs, etc), there is inevitably a need for considerable fiscal consolidation 
by the crisis-hit country. In addition, tight fiscal policy might be seen as a positive 
signal to international capital markets. On the other hand, the social damage of the 
                                                
5 Recent theoretical contributions in this area are by Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (2000, 
2003), Cespedes, Chang and Velasco (2000) and Krugman (2003), among others.   5 
crisis necessitates looser fiscal policy.
6 More importantly, fiscal policy is generally not 
a very flexible instrument to influence economic activity in the short run. This was 
made apparent during the Asian crisis of 1997-98 (see Boorman and Associates, 
2000).  
The  External  Balance  (EB)  schedule  which  assumes  that  the  balance  of 
payments is in “equilibrium”, is downward sloping. This is so as, other things equal, a 
fall  in  the  real  exchange  rate  (a  real  appreciation),  leads  to  a  loss  of  export 
competitiveness and a consequent worsening of the current account. This requires a 
rise in real interest rates to improve the capital account balance so as to ensure that 
the balance of payments regains “equilibrium”, i.e. ￿ = t R  k (where  = t R  international 
reserves and  k  is some target reserve level).
7 Points above and below the EB line 
depict balance of payments surplus and deficit, respectively.  
The  Internal  Balance  (IB)  schedule,  which  assumes  that  the  economy  is 
operating at full employment ( ) * = y yt , is upward sloping. This is so as a fall in the 
real exchange rate leads to a loss of export competitiveness and consequent decline 
in output below full employment, hence requiring lower real interest rates to stimulate 
domestic demand (investment and interest sensitive consumption). Points above and 
below  the  IB  schedule  indicate  recessionary  conditions  and  overheating, 
respectively.  
The  EB  and  IB  schedules  thus  divide  the  diagram  into  four  zones  or 
quadrants  (Figure  1a).  The  Swan  diagram  nicely  illustrates  that  one  needs  two 
instruments (interest rates and exchange rates) in order to attain both internal and 
external balance simultaneously (i.e. “Tinbergen’s Targets instruments approach”).  
                                                
6 See Kopits (2000) for a detailed discussion of the role of fiscal policy during a crisis and 
Heller (1997) for a more general discussion of fiscal policy management under open capital 
regimes. Heller (2002) offers an overview of the IMF’s perspective on “sound fiscal policy”. 
 
7 Recall that in the typical Keynesian setting – which is the implicit assumption behind the 
Swan diagram – prices are sticky, such that real exchange rate changes are largely due to 
nominal exchange rate changes (i.e. we abstract from the deflationary effects). We return to 
this issue later.   6 
Two criticisms of the Swan diagram come to mind immediately. First, in the 
presence of an open capital account, does not the assumption of exchange rates and 
interest  rates  as  independent  policy  instruments  violate  the  “Impossible  Trilogy” 
hypothesis? Second, even ignoring the impossible Trilogy, at the time of a crisis, how 
much control does a country really have on its exchange rate as an independent 
policy  instrument?  In  particular,  while  encouraging  or  engineering  a  currency 
depreciation (over and above a freely functioning market rate) is easy enough to do 
(either  via  verbal  interventions,  i.e.  talking  down  the  currency,  or  stockpiling  of 
reserves), what about a currency appreciation?
8     
The first question is easily answered by either assuming away perfect asset 
substitutability (Bansal and Dahlquist, 2000)
9, or by recognizing that the Impossible 
Trilogy does not on its own imply that an intermediate regime is unviable. A country 
could pursue a policy of a managed float and retain a degree of monetary policy 
autonomy (Frankel, 1999 and Rajan, 2002 and Rajan, 2003, Chapter 4).
10  
With regard to the second criticism, in the context of crisis management, apart 
from affecting the exchange rate via varying the interest rate, anther way of thinking 
about appreciating versus depreciating a currency during a crisis would be in terms 
of adjustment versus financing. Specifically, while currency depreciation can be seen 
as a type of adjustment policy, attempting to maintain the strength of the currency 
can be brought about via regional or multilateral financing (that is sterilized so as not 
to undermine the underlying monetary policy stance). Thus, the Swan diagram is not 
only  able  to  aid  in  the  discussion  of  the  issue  of  expenditure  switching  versus 
                                                
8 The implicit assumption here is that the country has a very limited stock of reserves. Of 
course, this may be one of the reasons why many countries in Asia have recently begun to 
stockpile reserves after having gone through the regional crisis of 1997-98 (Aizenman and 
Marion, 2003, IMF, 2003b, Rajan, 2004, Rajan, Siregar and Bird, 2005). 
 
9 Indeed, there is evidence suggesting that sterilization is effective in many developing and 
emerging economies.  
 
10 In any event, as will be discussed below, the risk adjusted uncovered interest parity is 
never violated.   7 
expenditure  reducing  (two  forms  of  adjustment),  it  also  implicitly  provides  some 
insights into the adjustment versus financing debate in the event of a crisis.
11 It is 
reasonable to expect that an external crisis that is permanent or intense -- especially 
a terms of trade one -- requires a real devaluation to regain competitiveness. In such 
an event, the following discussion (Section 5) can be viewed as pertaining to what 
happens post-devaluation, i.e. does one attempt to regain currency stability or allow it 
to decline even further? 
 
3.  Revisiting the EB Schedule: The Financial Side   
In view of the importance of sudden stops in new-style crises (the balance 
sheet effects are discussed in Section 4), the first obvious modification to the Swan 
diagram would be to interpret the EB schedule as solely depicting the non-official 
capital account balance. Indeed, it is the capital account that tends nowadays to be 
the  focus  of  crisis  management  policy.  The reason  for  considering  only  the  non-
official component of capital flows is that it allows us to keep the liquidity effects of 
official  financing  distinct  from  the  movements  of  the  EB  schedule.  From  a  policy 
perspective this can be justified by assuming that appropriate adjustment policies 
must  be  seen  as  being  independent  of  financing  (i.e.  prevent  moral  hazard 
problems).  
By separating the financial and the real sides of the economy (EB versus IB, 
respectively) one is able to isolate the effects of distinct shocks. For instance, while 
an export shock would have affected both the EB and IB schedules conventionally 
defined, in the current framework it has no direct influence on the EB which is capital 
account driven; only the IB schedule is affected (see Section 5).  
                                                
11 As Krugman (1998) notes, more effective would be a combination of large-scale official 
financing (which should be front-loaded), combined with rollovers, standstills and other sorts 
of  coordinated  private  sector  involvement  to  reduce  moral  hazard  effects  (i.e.  “bailing  in” 
versus “bailing out”). We do not delve into these issues here. See for instance, Boorman and 
Associates (2000), IMF-IEO (2003), Roubini (2001) and Willett (2002). 
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3.1  Simple Theory 
In the context of a small and highly open economy, the EB schedule might be 
reinterpreted in terms  of  the modified risk-adjusted,  uncovered real interest  parity 
(UIP) condition
12: 






t t i rp
e
e
i i i + + = +
+ r  + ￿t          (1) 
 
 
where: i* = foreign real interest rates,  ) ( t i rp  =  currency risk premium and  ) ( t i r  = 
probability of no default risk. Eq. (1) incorporates perverse feedback or Laffer curve 
effects,  i.e.  r’  <  0.  In  other  words,  a  rise  in  real  interest  rates  could  worsen 
anticipated  net  returns  by  lowering  the  probability  of  repayment.
13  In  addition, 
assuming risk aversion,  rp  > 0 and  ' rp  > 0.
14 Thus, Eq. (1) is an interest arbitrage 
condition that incorporates both default and currency risk. The last term (￿t) denotes 
a wedge that might prevent risk adjusted interest arbitrage for holding perfectly. (We 
elaborate on this at a later stage below.)  
Radelet and Sachs (1998) explain these perverse effects as follows:  
(In) the unique conditions of the midst of a financial panic, raising interest 
rates could have the perverse effect of weakening the currency.. Creditors 
understood that highly leveraged borrowers could quickly be pushed to 
insolvency as a result of several months of high interest rates. Moreover 
many  kinds  of  interest-sensitive  market  participants,  such  as  bond 
traders, are simply not active in Asia’s limited financial markets. The key 
participants  were  the  existing  holders  of  short  term  debt,  and  the 
important question was whether they would or not roll over their claims. 
                                                
12 For instance, see Basuro and Ghosh (2000), Dekle, Hsiao and Wang (2002), Furman and 
Stiglitz (1998), and especially Goldfajn and Baig (1999) and Montiel (2003). 
 
13 Default can be defined generally as including partial or delayed payments. In addition, r” < 
0. Note that this is not the only type of Laffer curve mechanism in international finance. For 
instance, see Krugman (1989) for a discussion of the debt relief Laffer curve. 
 
14 Two points should be noted. One, it is also possible that expected exchange rates could 
change,  i.e.  “elastic  expectations  of  change”  a  la  Charles  Kindelberger  (2001).  Also  see 
Montiel (2003). Ignoring the Laffer curve effects, Fama (1984) has shown that a necessary 
condition for there to be a perverse relationship between  t i  and 
e
t e 1 +  is if there is a negative 
correlation between risk premia and expected exchange rate changes. Two, the focus here is 
on risk perceptions. The actual impact of interest rate hikes on the real economy pertains to 
the EB schedule which is explored in Section 4. 
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High interest rates did not feed directly into these existing claims …It is 
possible, however, that by undermining the profitability of their corporate 
customers, higher interest rates discouraged foreign investors from rolling 
over their loans. 
 
However, Drazen (2003) questions the direct interest rate effects (perverse or 
otherwise) on exchange rates during a crisis period. As he notes:  
If the horizon over which a devaluation is expected is extremely short, 
interest  rates  must  be  raised  to  extraordinarily  high  levels  to  deter 
speculation  when  there  is  even  a  small  expected  devaluation.  For 
example, even if foreign currency assets bore no interest, an expected 
overnight devaluation of 0.5 percent would require an annual interest 
rate  of  over  500%  (1.005
365  -  1)*100  =  517  to  make  speculation 
unprofitable...Though  the  “arithmetic  problem”  suggests  why 
spectacular  defenses  may  have  only  limited  effects,  this  reasoning 
leaves other questions unanswered. First, why…might an interest rate 
defense..lead  to  even  greater  spectacular  pressures  against  the 
currency? That is, why would there be perverse feedback from raising 
interest rates to speculative pressures? Second, even in the absence 
of  perverse  feedback  effects,  the  “arithmetic  problem”  raises  the 
question of why they ever work. How can an effectively minor change 
in the cost of speculation have such significant, and one might say, 
disproportional effects?  
 
Drazen (2003) argues that the impact of short term interest rate changes on 
the  exchange rate may be more due to their  informational  content  (i.e. “signals”) 
rather than simply the costs of borrowing or investing (also see Drazen, 2000). In 
particular, on the one hand, a rise in real interest rates could be a positive signal to 
market participants who infer that the monetary authority is willing and able to make 
tough decisions, as well as highlights the authority’s degree of commitment to the 
peg.  On  the  other  hand,  poor  fundamentals  could  signal  a  loss  of  reserves  or 
desperation  of  policy  makers  in  the  face  of  persistent  speculative  attacks  or  the 
unsustainability of the high interest rate policy (given its high costs on the overall 
economy).  
There are others reasons why the risk premium term may co-vary positively 
with  interest  rates.  For  instance,  a  tight  interest  rate  policy  could  raise  the 
government’s contingent fiscal deficits (Flood and Jeanne, 2000). This in turn might 
spook  international  capital  markets  hence  further  weakening  the  currency.  If  the 
perverse effects are significant, the EB schedule -- which now depicts the capital   10 
account  balance more narrowly  --  becomes fairly  steep.
15 While  it  is  theoretically 
possible for the EB schedule to be upward sloping, it is generally acknowledged that 
this is highly unlikely (Frankel, 2001).
16  
There is a burgeoning empirical literature on the exchange rate-interest rate 
nexus  with  conflicting/inconclusive  results  (see  the  recent  literature  review  by 
Montiel, 2003; also see Boorman and Associates, 2000). This is not surprising in 
view of the different model specifications, methodologies, sample frequencies and 
country  coverage  of  the  studies.  A  more  promising  line  of  research  appears  to 
involve concentrating on a narrower set of issues in relation to Eq. 1 rather than the 
general nexus between exchange rates and interest rates. For instance, Basuro and 
Ghosh (2000)  find  little  evidence  that  higher  real  interest  rates  lead to  increased 
estimated risk premia in the crisis-hit East Asian economies of Indonesia, Korea and 
Thailand. Similarly, with regard to signalling effects, empirical analysis suggests that 
these  effects  are  generally  positive  in  the  short  term  but  perverse  if  persistent 
(Drazen and Hubrich 2003).     
  In  any event,  since the reformulation of the  EB  schedule is based  on the 
interest parity condition, points off the EB schedule arise due to a wedge between 
exchange rates and interest rates (￿t). Specifically, points above the EB schedule 
could  either  denote  persistent  reserve  accumulation  (which  are  assumed  to  be 
sterilized) or the fact that controls on reserve flows are in place. So high interest rates 
could  be  sustained  at  a  given  exchange  rate  if  capital  controls  on  inflows  are 
stiffened  or  reserves  are  accumulated.  Points  below  the  EB  conversely  denote 
                                                
15 Thus, any point above the EB schedule implies a non-official capital account surplus, while 
that  below  implies  a  capital  account  deficit.  If  one  assumes  that  the  current  account 
adjustments  are  relatively  sluggish,  this  corresponds  to  a  BOP  surplus  and  deficit, 
respectively.  
 
16 Krugman (1999) has noted: 
I  have  heard  some  people  propose  what  amounts  to  a  sort  of  foreign 
exchange-interest  rate  Laffer  curve:  if  you  cut  interest  rates  this  will 
strengthen the economy, and the currency will actually rise. This is as silly as 
it sounds.  
   11 
reserve  depletion  (which  of  course,  cannot  be  sustained)  or  controls  of  capital 
outflows that can be fairly effectively maintained (Figure 1b) 
 
4.  Revisiting the IB Schedule: The Real Side  
    As discussed above, while the EB schedule characterizes the financial side of 
the economy, the IB depicts the real side of the economy. The IB schedule ( de di/ ) 
can be re-written as follows:  
 
* | )] / /( ) / [( / y y i y e y de di = ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ - =                               (2)
17 
 
  where y* = full employment. In other words, as noted, the EB schedule denotes all 
combinations of i and e such that output remains at its full employment level. There is 
little controversy about the denominator in equation 2 which is negative. What about 
the  numerator?  The  conventional  view  is  that  the  numerator  is  unambiguously 
positive (due to the pro-competitiveness effects). Thus, if real interest rates rise, real 
exchange rates must rise as well to maintain internal balance, hence deriving an 
upward sloping IB schedule.  
“New Structuralists” challenged both this analysis and the policy prescription 
that  followed  on  from  it  (Taylor,  1981).  They  argued  that  devaluation  would  be 
contractionary  and that IMF programs were  stagflationary. The  New Structuralists 
have  outlined  various  routes  via  which  devaluation  may,  in  principle,  have  a 
contractionary effect spanning both aggregate demand and aggregate supply. These 
contractionary  channels  have  been  extensively  discussed  elsewhere  and  will 
therefore not be detailed here (for instance, see Agenor and Montiel, 1999, Bird and 
Rajan, 2004, Caves, Frankel and Jones, 2003, Chapter 24 and Lizondo and Montiel, 
1989).  Suffice  it  to  note  that  by  and  large,  the  New  Structuralists  literature  has 
                                                
17 Eq. (2) is easily derived as follows:  0 ) / ( ) / ( = ¶ ¶ + ¶ ¶ = di i y de e y dy . 
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focused on the demand  side and the “real sector”. However, as indicated by the 
Dornbusch quote in Section 1, the emphasis of new-style or capital account crises is 
on the financial or balance sheet side of the economy. Indeed, it is unlikely that the 
“conventional”  contractionary  effects  of  devaluation  via  the  current  account  can 
explain  the  magnitude  and  ferocity  of  some  economic  contractions  following 
devaluation.  
 
4.1  Assumptions 
In  view  of  the  importance  of  the  balance  sheet  effect  in  recent  crises  in 
developing economies it would be useful to consider a simple formalization of the 
issue based on a variant of the framework initially outlined by Aghion, Bachetta and 
Banerjee (2000).  
In its simplest form the model extends over two periods, assumes a single 
tradable good, and the economy is made up of identical entrepreneurs/firms which 
are  credit  constrained  a  la  Bernanke  and  Gertler,  1989  and  Bernanke,  Gertler, 
Gilchrist, 1998).  Prices  in each period are fixed/preset  at  the beginning  of  period 
(assumed  to  equal  to  1)  such  that  monetary  policy  does  have  temporary  real 
effects.
18  Purchasing  power  parity  (PPP)  holds  in  the  second  period  (ex-post 
deviations are allowed in the first period when there is an external disturbance). In 
other  words,  the  effects  of  external  shocks  disappear  in  the  second  period.  Risk 
adjusted UIP holds imperfectly (perverse effects are ignored).  
 
4.2  Basic Model Structure of Real Side of Economy 
 
t y =  t k s  +  x( 1 - t e )   and   x’(.) > 0            (3) 
    
                                                
18 This could arise because of menu costs or other frictions. Empirical analysis on currency 
crises in developing and emerging economies suggests that the impact of devaluations is 
deflationary rather than stagflationary, i.e. inflation does not rise following a large devaluation 
(for instance, see Burstein, Eichenbaum and Rebelo, 2002 and Goldfajn and Werlang, 2000). 
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t k =  t w +  t d                      (4) 
    
t d =  t tw h                       (5) 
  
t h = h( 1 - t i
 ,  1 - t e
 )  and   1 h  (.) < 0,  2 h  (.) < 0            (6) 
 
t p  =  t y  -  t c                       (7) 
  
t c = (1+  t i )d
c
 + (1+ 
* i )( t e / 1 - t e
 )( t d -d
c
).             (8) 
 
 
where: t y  = real output;  t k = real capital stock;  t x  = export function;  t w  = domestic 
wealth in real terms;  t p  = profit function in real terms;  t c  = costs in real terms;  t d  =  
total debt in real terms; d
c
 = domestic debt in real terms (assumed to be fixed); ( t d  - 
d
c
) = unhedged foreign debt in real terms. 
  Eq. (3) states that in the long run sustainable output is characterized by linear 
production technology with capital as the sole input. However, output in the short run 
could  deviate  from  the  sustainable  level  in  the  case  of  export  demand  shocks. 
Exports  in  turn  are  positively  related  to  real  exchange  rate  variations  (i.e.  real 
depreciation boosts exports and output).
19  
Eq.  (4)  states  that  the  capital  stock  is  financed  by  available  wealth 
(“entrepreneurship”)  as  well  as  by  debt/borrowing.  Capital  stock  is  assumed  to 
depreciate fully in one period. 
Eq. (5)  states that the amount of borrowing to finance  capital spending is 
proportional to available wealth ( t h ). In other words, financial markets are imperfect; 
firms are credit constrained and the total amount of borrowing is limited by available 
collateral. Table 2 summarizes available evidence on the extent of leverage of Asian 
corporations prior to the 1997-98 crisis. 
                                                
19  We  abstract  from  the  New  Structuralist  reasons  as  to  why  devaluation  might  be 
contractionary.  Aghion-Baccheta-Banerjee  do  not  incorporate  the  export  demand  effect. 
Neither do they allow for the bank crisis channel. 
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Eq.  (6)  state  that  t h   falls  with  domestic  interest  rate  hikes  or  currency 
depreciations,  i.e.  1 h (.)  <  0  and  2 h (.)  <  0.
20
  Intuitively,  as  interest  rates  in  the 
economy increase or the currency devalues, other things being equal, the greater the 
probability  of  corporate  bankruptcies  and  a  consequent  worsening  of  the  credit 
position of the banks (i.e. a rise in the share of non-performing loans). This could 
lead  to  an  outright  banking  crisis  and  an  economy-wide  credit  crunch.
21  Using  a 
sample of 19 developing and emerging economies over the period 1991-91, Mulder, 
Perrelli  and  Rocha  (2002)  find  that  corporate  balance  sheet  variables  (such  as 
leveraged financing and high short term debt to working capital) affect the depth of a 
crisis (measured as the weighted loss of exchange rates and reserves), particularly 
when they interact with the total size of bank credit. This suggests that crises tend to 
be most intense when “corporate weaknesses are transmitted through the banking 
system” (p.15).
22  
Eq. (7) is simply the profit function (revenues less costs) for the typical firm; 
and  Eq.  (8)  is  the  firm’s  cost  function.  The  only  cost  considered  here  is  that  on 
interest  incurred  on  borrowing.  Specifically,  the  first  term  on  the  right  hand  side 
(r.h.s.) of Eq. (8) is the real interest cost on domestic debt, while the second term on 
the r.h.s. is the real interest cost on foreign debt that is accumulated in the beginning 
of the period or at the end of the previous period. While foreign interest rates are 
assumed to  be fixed, the interest on domestic  debt is  assumed  to be  floating or 
                                                
20 Aghion, Baccheta and Banerjee (2003) implicitly assume that  2 h (.) = 0. 
 
21 An obvious limitation of the above framework is the absence of a banking sector. Aghion, 
Baccheta and Banerjee (2003) extend their original (2000) model to incorporate a competitive 
banking sector. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) investigate the transmission of shocks following 
declines  in  asset  prices  and  falls  in  collateral  values  (leading  to  bankruptcies  and  credit 
crunches).  Also  see  Krugman  (2003)  who  refers  to  the  incorporation  of  asset  prices  and 
balance sheet effects as “fourth generation” crisis model. 
  
22  Eichengreen  and  Arteta  (2002,  Table  1)  succinctly  summarize  the  principal  empirical 
studies on banking crises. Their comprehensive empirical investigation finds rapid domestic 
credit growth to be one of the few robust causes of banking crises. 
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variable.
23 We do not concern ourselves here with how and why firms might choose 
the mix between domestic and foreign currency debt (See Section 6).  
  With appropriate substitutions we have: 
 
 
t p  =  t y
 - [(1 +  t i )d
c 
+ (1 + 
* i )( t e / 1 - t e
 )( t d -d
c
)].        (9) 
 
Assume a  is a proportion of profits that is retained by the firm (assume they 
are consumed or distributed for simplicity).
24 Thus, wealth holdings (which acts as 
collateral) can be written as follows:  
 
1 + t w  = (1 - a ) t p  +  t w
                       (10) 
 
The question we are interested in here is what is the impact of a change in  1 e  
on  2 y ? From Eq. (10), we have: 
 
2 w  = (1 - a ) 1 p                                           (11)
25 
 
So,  2 y   = s (1 + h(.)) 2 w  + x (.) 
 
     = s (1 +h (.))(1 - a )[ 1 y
 - (1 +  1 i )d
c
 - (1 + 
* i ) 1 e ( 1 d -d
c






Note that  ) / ( / 1 2 1 2 e y de dy ¶ ¶ = +  ) / )( / ( 1 1 1 2 e i i y ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶                  (13) 






                                                
23  Aghion-Bacchetta-Banerjee  assume  that  the  interest  rate  on  domestic  debt  is  on  fixed 
terms, thus ignoring this interest rate channel.  
 
24 In a fuller general equilibrium model this would need to be modeled explicitly. 
 
25 Note that  1 w  = 0. 
 
26 Note that  1 P  =  0 e  = 1. 
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4.3  Output Effects of Real Devaluation: Theory 
Referring to Eq. (13), (a) and (b) essentially denote the IB schedule (see Eq. 
2); (c) is the EB schedule (see Eq. 1) which is unambiguously negative (ignoring 
strong  perverse  Laffer  curve  or  signalling  effects).  Our  focus  here  is  on  the  IB 
schedule. 
(b) is unambiguously negative. Why? First is the “credit easing” channel:  1 h (.) 




(a) cannot be signed a priori. Why? There are three channels that need to be 
considered. First is the “pro-competitiveness” channel which is positive:  ' x (.) > 0. 
Second is the “bank crisis” / “credit crunch” or “illiquidity” channel which is negative: 
2 h (.) <  0. Third  is  the  balance  sheet  or “insolvency”  channel:  -[(1  + 
* i )( 1 d -d
c
)] 
which is also negative, i.e. a real depreciation leads to a rise in the domestic value of 
existing unhedged foreign debt due to currency depreciation and reduced profits (we 
explore  this  issue  in  Section  6).  Some  might  question  why  the  valuation  effects 
involve real rather than nominal depreciation. While the assumption of price rigidity 
makes this distinction irrelevant here, more importantly, the appropriate comparison 
is not nominal devaluation versus doing nothing. If a real depreciation is called for 
and nominal exchange rates are rigid, the result will be domestic deflation and a rise 
in  the  country’s  risk  premium  in  anticipation  of  expected  devaluation  at  a  later 
stage.
28  This  in  turn  will  raise  the  country’s  level  of  indebtedness  even  absent a 
nominal devaluation (Cespedes, Chang and Velasco, 2000).     
This simple model highlights a number of channels via which devaluation may 
affect  output  and  provides  the  microfoundations  for  the  IB  schedule.  If  the  pro-
competiveness channel outweighs the other two channels, we have the conventional 
                                                
27  While  not  discussed  in  this  simple  supply-side  model,  there  is  the  possibility  of  the 
conventional Keynesian demand channel which works in the same direction.  
 
28 Recent examples in this regard have been Argentina and Hong Kong to a lesser extent 
(Rajan, 2003, Chapter 4). 
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effect, viz.  2 y ¶ / 1 e ¶  > 0 and an upward sloping IB schedule
29; else the IB schedule is 
downward sloping.
30 Regardless of the slope of the IB schedule, as discussed, points 
above the schedule denote recession or output operating at below capacity, while 
points below denote overheating or output running at above capacity (Figure 1b). 
 
4.4  Output Effects of Real Devaluation: Empirics 
There has been a large and growing empirical literature testing the output 
effects of real devaluation. Results have been rather inconclusive, with suggestions 
of devaluations being contractionary in short run but not over time after controlling for 
various factors including monetary and fiscal policies (for instance, see Kamin and 
Klau, 1998). This gives rise to the oft-noted “V-shaped” post-crisis output dynamics.  
Rajan and Shen (2003) find that there exists a difference between crisis and 
non-crisis  periods,  i.e.  “state  contingent”  devaluation.  Using  annual  data  from  24 
countries over the period 1981 and 1999 they find that real devaluation in “normal” 
times  is  not  contractionary.  Only  “crisis-induced”  devaluations  appear  to  be 
contractionary.
31  While  there  are  a  number  of  possible  factors  driving  this  result 
(including concerns about spurious correlation and reverse causality), one reason for 
this  might  have  to  do  with  the  size  of  depreciations.  Specifically,  with  “small” 
                                                
29 For instance, Goldstein (1998) has noted: 
When market participants lose confidence in a currency and attach a high 
probability to further falls, it is difficult to induce them to hold the currency 
without  higher  interest  rates…Moreover,  halting  a free fall  of  the  currency 
takes on added importance when banks or corporations in the crisis country 
have large foreign currency obligations coming due in the short term. 
 
30 Cespedes, Chang and Velasco (2000) present a dynamic stochastic model that allows for 
the default risk premium (the r  term in Eq. 1) to be endogenously determined by the net 
worth of the corporate sectors. One could also assume that risk premium is procyclical for 
various  reasons.  For  instance,  risk  perceptions  could  rise  with  dimming  export  growth 
prospects. Conversely, one could assume that changes in rp directly influence the size of 
external  debt  ( t d   -  d
c
).  Either  of  these  complicates  the  analysis  as  it  implies  dynamic 
interlinkages between the EB and IB schedules which can no longer be seen as independent. 
 
31 Their definition of currency crisis is based on and output Goldstein, Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(2000). They consider both actual devaluations as well as exchange market pressure that 
does not lead to an actual devaluation. They measure output as deviations from a trend. 
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exchange rate changes (i.e. during “normal” periods) the pro-competitiveness effect 
might dominate, while for “large” ones (i.e. during “crisis” periods) the balance sheet 
and bank crisis channels may dominate (Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee, 2000 and 
Krugman, 2003).
32 Graphically this corresponds to an IB schedule that is positively 
sloped but backward bending for large devaluations (discussed in Section 5). Lahiri 
and Vegh (2001) suggest a non-linear or “fear of floating” rule, whereby authorities 
should allow the currency to float in response to a “small shock” but should try and 
avoid any large real exchange rate changes. 
Given the possible difference between crises and non-crises periods, Gupta, 
Mishra  and  Sahay  (2001)  focus  specifically  on  195  crisis  episodes  across  91 
developing countries between 1970 and 1998.
33 They find that the size of the export 
sector  is  positively  associated  with  short  run  growth,  while  short  term  debt  to 
reserves and nominal debt burdens are both negatively associated to growth, though 
the latter is statistically insignificant. The study also finds that output contractions 
post-crisis are more likely the greater the initial (i.e. precrisis) capital inflows into the 
country and the more liberal the country’s capital and current account transactions. In 
addition, contractions are more likely if trade competitors devalue as this negates the 
pro-competitiveness effects of any single country.   
There  is  a  small  but  growing  literature  investigating  the  effect  of  sharp 
devaluations on individual firms rather than aggregate macro variables. For instance, 
Forbes (2002) uses a database from Worldscope covering over 13,500 non-financial 
companies in 42 countries between 1997 and 2000. On examining events of large 
                                                
32 Two other reasons for this may be the sharp curtailment of private capital inflows during a 
crisis period (captured by the EB schedule), or contagion which limits the pro-competitiveness 
effects of devaluation in any single country.  
 
33  The  authors  use  a  number  of  standard  definitions  of  crisis,  including  that  based  on 
Goldstein, Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000). They measure output as the difference in average 
growth in the crisis and the first post-crisis periods and the average growth in three pre-crisis 
tranquil periods.   
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depreciations in 12 countries (with the other 30 countries used as a control group),
34 
she found that in the year after the depreciation, firms generally experience a rise in 
market capitalization but a decline in growth in net income (in local currencies). This 
suggests  to  the  author  that  depreciations  in general  lower  immediate  income  but 
raises  future  expected  profit.  In  other  words,  large  or  crisis-induced  devaluations 
appear  to  be  contractionary  in  the  short  run  but  not  over  time.  Turning  to  firm 
characteristics, the findings indicate that firms with higher debt ratios tend to have 
lower  income  growth,  while  firms  with  greater  foreign  sales  exposures  performed 
notably better after depreciations. This is broadly consistent with the stylized model 
discussed above. 
 
5.  Implications for Crisis Management: Stylized Examples 
What are the implications of the preceding discussion for crisis management? 
As a first step, it is useful to note that, as with the conventional Swan diagram, there 
are four distinct quadrants off the EB and IB schedules (Figure 1a). To return to 
internal  and  external  balance  simultaneously  requires  a  combination  of  policies. 
Optimal policy combinations could differ depending on whether the IB is positively or 
negatively  sloped,  and  if  the  latter,  whether  it  is  steeper  or  flatter  than  the  EB 
schedule.  Consider  the  conventional  case  where  the  EB  schedule  is  negatively 
sloped  and  fairly  elastic  (i.e.  highly  interest  sensitive)  and  the  IB  schedule  is 
positively  sloped. We  refer  to  this  as  Case  1a  (Figure  2).  If  the  bank  crisis  and 
balance sheet channels dominate the pro-competitiveness effects, the IB schedule is 
downward sloping. Assuming that the EB schedule remains downward sloping but is 
fairly inelastic (due to the significance of perverse Laffer curve and signalling effects), 
there are two other possible cases. Case 1b (Figure 3) is where the IB schedule is 
                                                
34 The twelve events are: Thailand (July 1997), Philippines (July 1997), Indonesia (August 
1997 and January 1999), Malaysia (September 1997), South Korea (November 1997), Czech 
Republic (February 1998), Greece (March 1998), South Africa (June 1998), Mexico (August 
1998), Pakistan (August 1998), Israel (October 1998) and Brazil (January 1999).    
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steeper  than  the  EB  schedule.  Case  1c  (Figure  4)  is  where  the  EB  schedule  is 
steeper than the IB schedule. Rather than examine all policy combinations for all 
quadrants for all cases, we instead focus on stylized cases when an economy is 
initially in equilibrium (internal and external balance) but is then hit by a (negative) 
external shock. This is justifiable by the fact that the reason for the reformulation of 
the  Swan  diagram  in  the  first  instance  has  been  to  examine  optimal  policy 
combinations in the event of a crisis. We consider two stylized shocks below, viz. risk 
premium shock and export shock as well as a combination of both. 
 
5.1  Adverse Risk Premium Shock 
Consider the case of a negative exogenous risk premium shock which leads 
to a sudden stop in capital flows. This can be depicted by a rightward shift of the EB 
schedule.
35 What mix of policies is needed to maintain both internal and external 
balance? In Case 1a there is a need for the IMF’s conventional policy mix of real 
exchange rate depreciation and higher interest rates, i.e. expenditure reducing plus 
expenditure switching. In Case 1b the external shock requires tighter monetary policy 
but real exchange rate appreciation, i.e. expenditure reducing plus financing which is 
frontloaded. The intuition is straightforward. A rise in risk premium disturbs the capital 
account balance and requires a rise in interest rate to regain equilibrium. The rise in 
interest rates causes output to fall below full employment level, hence necessitating 
an  exchange  rate  depreciation  (adjustment)  in  Case  1a  and  an  appreciation 
(financing) in Case 1b. In Case 1c the external shock requires a combination of real 
depreciation and looser monetary policy, i.e. expenditure increasing plus expenditure 
switching policies. The intuition here is as follows. Given that the EB schedule is 
more  interest  elastic  than  the  IB  schedule,  the  principle  of  effective  classification 
                                                
35 Of course, as noted in Section 4, risk perceptions might not be entirely exogenous, e.g. 
they could be pro-cyclical.    21 
suggests that the external balance is best regained via currency devaluation. This in 
turn leads to a domestic contraction, hence requiring a monetary expansion.  
 
5.2  Adverse Export Shock 
A similar exercise can be carried out in the event of a negative export shock. 
In such a case the IB schedule shifts down. Once again we have three cases (2a-c). 
In  Case  2a  if  the  IB  schedule  is  positively  sloped  (the  EB  is  always  assumed 
negatively sloped), the policy mix to regain internal and external balance would be to 
lower  interest  rates  and  a  depreciated  currency  (Figure  5).  In  Case  2b  with  a 
negatively sloped IB schedule, and as long as it is steeper than the EB schedule, the 
appropriate policy combination is tighter interest rates and a stronger currency. In 
Case 2c where the EB schedule is steeper than the IB schedule, the policy mix to 
simultaneously regain internal and external balance would be to loosen monetary 
policy and permit the currency to depreciate, just as in Case 2a. Table 3 summarizes 
the foregoing results.  
 
5.3  Combination of Shocks and Policy Complexities 
What if the economy were to be hit by a combination of adverse risk premium 
and export shocks? It  is easy to  see that in the case of  a conventionally  sloped 
upward  sloping  IB  schedule  (Cases  1a-2a), the  appropriate  policy  response  is  to 
allow  the  currency  to  depreciate,  though  the  direction  of  interest  rate  policy  is 
ambiguous. However, in the other two cases (i.e. Cases 1b-2b and Case 1c-2c) the 
crisis management policies remain unchanged.  
Appropriate policy combinations could become especially complicated if one 
assumes that the slope  of the EB schedule  is generally upward sloping but then 
switches to being downward sloping in the event of sharp depreciations. As Figure 8 
shows, in the event of an adverse risk premium shock, it is unclear as to what the 
optimal combination of adjustment versus financing policies would be (points 1
0 and   22 
1
2). Indeed, there could also be circumstances where there is a non-intersection of 
the EB and IB schedules such that there would be no combination of policies that 
attain external and internal balance simultaneously (point 1
1).
36 Note that in such an 
event, there is a need for a third instrument such as fiscal policy (which will shift the 
IB schedule up) if both internal and external balance is to be regained. Intuitively, 
ceteris  paribus,  expansionary  fiscal  policy  requires  tighter  interest  rates  to  keep 
output  at  full  employment,  hence  shifting  the  IB  schedule  upwards  (also  see 
Krugman, 1998). 
As the preceding analysis emphasizes, the optimal combination of policies is 
subject to a lot of “ifs and buts” depending on the type of external shock and the 
exchange and interest rate elasticities of internal and external balance curves. This 
ambiguity  nicely  captures  the  policy  debate  that  has  been  rife  at  the  IMF  and 
elsewhere on dealing with new-style crises.
37 For instance, consider the following 
description of the internal debate within various IMF departments on the appropriate 
monetary policy stance to deal with the crisis in Indonesia (The three departments 
involved  were  the  PDR  or  Policy  Development  Review,  MAE  or  Monetary  and 
Exchange Affairs Department and RES or Research department): 
The..PDR..and MAE argued for tight monetary policy with high interest 
rates. PDR argued that the corporate and banking sectors could not 
bear  the  added  costs  from  any  further  depreciation...On  the  other 
hand,..(the research  RES and APD argued against further tightening 
monetary policy and raising interest rates. RES was concerned that an 
interest rate defense was not feasible with a weak banking system 
and  a  vulnerable  corporate  sector. It  pointed  out  that  if  confidence 
remained low.. higher interest rates would damage the corporate and 
banking  sectors,  thereby  further  eroding  confidence…(IMF-IEO, 
2003).  
 
This example is as good a reminder as any that in most cases the appropriate 
answer to many a macroeconomic question is “it depends on the circumstances at 
                                                
36 This could also occur if the EB and IB schedules are more or less parallel and hence do not 
intersect (Frankel, 2001).  
 
37 Indonesia was the worst impacted by the Asian crisis of 1997-98, experiencing an output 
contraction of almost 30 percent of GDP.   23 
hand”.  When  determining  appropriate  crisis  management  policies,  policy  makers 
need to be cognizant of (a) the potential perverse effects of capital flows in response 
to interest rate changes; (b) the extent of leverage of the corporate sector (in terms of 
aggregate  size,  currency  denomination  and  maturity  structure);  (c)  the  extent  of 
financial sector vulnerabilities; and (d) the possible influences of exchange rate and 
interest rate changes on the corporate and financial sectors and their repercussions 
on the overall economy. 
 
6.  Concluding Remarks 
The new-style currency crises that have inflicted a number of developing and 
emerging  economies  of  late  are  characterized  by  sudden  stops  in  capital  inflows 
(flow issue) and adverse balance sheet effects (stock issue). This paper has argued 
that the age-old Swan diagram, appropriately modified, is able to provide quite useful 
insights into how a country might manage the crisis via a combination of expenditure 
switching and reducing polices (adjustment) and financing.  
Given the uncertainties with regard to management of new-style crisis noted 
above (also see Boorman and Associates, 2000), it is all the more important to try 
and  minimize  the  chances  of  such  crises  occurring  in  the  first  instance. While  a 
detailed elaboration on steps to strengthen crisis prevention is well beyond the scope 
of this paper (see Bird and Rajan, 2002 and Rajan, 2003, Chapter 3), the issue of 
liability  dollarization  warrants  exploring.  After  all,  it  is  this  factor  that  plays  a 
significant  role  in  determining  the  slope  of  the  Internal  Balance  schedule  and 
accordingly, raises challenges and uncertainties with regard to what constitutes an 
optimal policy mix.  
What steps need to be taken to reduce vulnerability due to uncovered foreign 
currency  borrowing?  There  are  two  closely  related  questions. Why  are  emerging 
economies unable to borrow overseas in their own currencies especially long term,   24 
and  therefore  unable  to  hedge,  i.e.  “original  sin”  phenomenon.  (Eichengreen, 
Hausmann and Panizza, 2003). As Hausmann (1999) notes: 
if a country cannot borrow in its own currency, it cannot hedge the 
exposure to its foreign debt. To do so, foreigners would have to take a 
long  position  in  pesos, and  that  is  equivalent  to  assuming that  the 
country can borrow abroad in pesos” (p.144).
38  
 
Of course, there is always a price at which lenders will be willing to lend in a 
foreign  currency,  i.e.  at  an  interest  premium.
39  Insofar  as  the  premium  that  is 
generated  in  emerging  market  interest  rates  reflects  currency  and  country  risk 
perceptions,  a  closely  related  question  is,  why  are  domestic  borrowers  (in  the 
emerging economy) unwilling to pay that premium and instead choose to borrow in 
foreign currency despite the inherent riskiness of these actions? At least two possible 
reasons come to mind.  
One, there  could  be  an  asymmetry  in  the  risk perception  of  the  domestic 
agents (potential borrowers) and foreign creditors, with the former’s risk perceptions 
being less than the latter’s. This could arise because of different information sets or 
the  domestic  agents  expecting  a  bailout  by  the  government  in  the  event  of  an 
adverse shock. If this is the case, the only willing borrowers at high interest rates will 
be those least likely to repay the loans. This adverse selection problem in turn raises 
the risk premium levied by foreign lenders, which could become prohibitively high.  
Two, if domestic agents in the emerging economy are concerned about the 
possibility of being hit by random real shocks which might affect their cash flow and 
thus their ability to repay the high interest, on the one hand, and if there are nontrivial 
costs of defaulting interest payments during downturns, on the other, rational cost-
benefit  calculus  may  lead  domestic  agents  to  opt  for  “cheaper”  foreign  currency 
borrowing. This point is formalized by Jeanne (2002). 
                                                
38 Slavov (2003) explores the issue of hedging in emerging economies in some detail with 
particular reference to Asia. 
 
39  For  bank-based  explanations  of  the  persistent  interest  premia  offered  by  emerging 
economies, see Bird and Rajan (2001).    25 
How  might  a  country  overcome  the  original  sin  phenomenon  short  of 
imposing  outright  restrictions  on  foreign  borrowing  (quantitative  or  otherwise)? 
Returning to the reason for the risk premium required to induce foreign creditors to 
hold  the  emerging  economy’s  currency  at  the  margin,  while  part  of  default  risk 
premium has to do with concerns about creditworthiness of the country (i.e. risk of 
non-payment), part of the currency risk premium has to do with the lack of credibility 
of the monetary authorities.  
The  default  risk  premium  could  possibly  be  reduced  if  the  government  or 
international  agencies  (such  as the World  Bank)  act  as guarantors for  at  least  a 
portion of the country’s debt, though this could lead to concerns about moral hazard. 
With  regard  to  the  currency  risk  premium,  the  concern  about  investing  in  the 
country’s  currency  is  that  there  is the  possibility  that  the  monetary  authority  may 
choose  to opportunistically inflate the economy /  devalue the currency. Thus, the 
argument has recently been made that a precondition for foreigners to be willing to 
hold the emerging economy’s assets is that it be widely held by domestic agents. The 
rationale is that with a wide holding of the domestic assets by domestic residents it is 
much less likely that the government will be tempted to erode the real value of the 
debt.
40  In  this  regard,  countries  should  actively  foster  the  development  of  well-
functioning  and  vibrant  domestic  and  regional  bond  markets,  a  policy 
recommendation that many developing countries in Asia and Latin America appear to 
have taken on board. 
                                                
40 Closely related to this risk-of-inflation (i.e. expropriation) argument, McLean and Shrestha 
(2001)  have  suggested  that  the  development  of  a  euro  bond  market  is  also  a  means  of 
overcoming  the  original  sin  phenomenon.  They  find  evidence  that  this  was  the  case  in 
Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, none of which appear to be plagued by the original 
sin problem.    26 
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Four Quadrants of the Conventional Swan Diagram 
 
     
 





















Four Quadrants of the New-Style Swan Diagram
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1 The assumption here is that the IB schedule is upward sloping. As noted, the IB schedule could 
also be downward sloping. However, the general conclusion, viz. points above the IB schedule denote 
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Figure 2 
Crisis Management Following an Adverse Risk Premium Shock: Case 1a  
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Table 1 
Sudden Stops: Number of Events (% of sample) 
 
 
“Standard” Currency Crises and Current Account Reversals
a,b,c 
 
  Currency Crisis  No Crisis 
Current Account Reversal  24 (6%)  65 (16%) 
No Current Account Reversal  25 (6%)  300 (72%) 
 
“Major” Crises and Current Account Reversals
a,b,c 
 
  Currency Crisis  No Crisis 
Current Account Reversal  18 (4%)  35 (9%) 
No Current Account Reversal  22 (5%)  339 (82%) 
 
Notes:    a)  A “standard” (“major”) currency  crises  is  defined  as  a  deviation  of  the  exchange  market 
pressure index (based on Glick and Hutchison (2001) of more than 2 (3) standard deviations 
from the country-specific mean.  
b) A “standard” (“major”) current account reversal is defined as a change in the current account 
to GDP ratio of more than 3 (5) percentage points.    
  c) Number in parenthesis refer to the proportion out of country years in sample     






Extent of Leverage in Selected Developing Asian Economies (Debt to Equity), 1990-96 
 
Economy  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996 
Hong Kong  1.783  2.047  1.835  1.758  2.273  1.980  1.559 
Indonesia  n.a.  1.943  2.097  2.054  1.661  2.115  1.878 
Korea  3.105  3.221  3.373  3.636  3.530  3.776  3.545 
Malaysia  1.010  0.610  0.627  0.704  0.991  1.103  1.176 
Philippines  n.a.  0.830  1.186  1.175  1.148  1.150  1.285 
Singapore  0.939  0.887  0.856  1.102  0.862  1.037  1.049 




Japan  2.871  2.029  2.042  2.057  2.193  2.367  2.374 
Germany  1.582  1.594  1.507  1.534  1.512  1.485  1.472 
US  0.904  0.972  1.059  1.051  1.066  1.099  1.125 
 
Source: Claessens, Djankov and Xu (2000) 
 




Optimal Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy Mix 
 
   
Adverse Risk Premium Shock 
 
Adverse Export Shock 




higher  interest  rate  (expenditure 
reducing) and 
real  exchange  rate  depreciation 
(expenditure switching) 
Case 2a 
lower  interest  rate  (expenditure 
increasing) and 
real  exchange  rate  depreciation 
(expenditure switching) 
Downward  sloping 
IB  but  steeper  than 
EB 
Case 1b 
higher  interest  rate  (expenditure 
reducing) and 
real  exchange  rate  appreciation 
(financing) 
Case 2b 
higher interest rate (expenditure reducing) 
and  
real  exchange  rate  appreciation 
(financing) 
Downward  sloping 
IB  but  flatter  than 
EB 
Case 1c 
lower  interest  rate  (expenditure 
increasing) and 
real  exchange  rate  depreciation 
(expenditure switching) 
Case 2c 
lower  interest  rate  (expenditure 
increasing) and  
real  exchange  rate  depreciation 
(expenditure switching) 
 